associations being attributed to it. Indeed, it is this gap between reputation and reality that this chapter will explore. Admittedly, the ISC was deservedly a controversial institution, and there was often a great deal of substance in the criticism. That being said, by the standards that are typically employed to assess the impact of think tanks in relation to public policy, particularly in Britain, the ISC would probably be viewed as having a marginal impact at best. 4 On the other hand, both Crozier and the ISC were portrayed as important British representatives of a much wider transnational anti-communist network. In this respect, a transnational appreciation of their role is crucial.
To examine these issues, this chapter is divided into five sections. It will begin by providing background information about the Institute and its activities. Next it will highlight the ISC's "mixed" relationships in Whitehall and Westminster. The following section will describe the ISC's relationships with other transnational anti-communist groups. This will be followed by a section detailing the criticisms of the ISC in the press and parliament. The final section describes the events leading up to Crozier's defenestration and the subsequent decline of the ISC in the 1980s.
Background
The ISC was the brainchild of Brian Crozier, and grew out of his earlier work as a journalist and as head of Forum World Features (FWF), a CIA front company responsible for disseminating anti-Soviet propaganda. A key point that should be noted before proceeding further is that Crozier was not only a Cold War activist, and an individual who thrived as an intriguer, but he was usually busy with many projects running simultaneously. By the late 1960s, in addition to his work with FWF, Crozier came up with the idea of starting up a research centre that would focus on such topics as subversion, terrorism, insurgency and revolutionary movements, primarily in the context of the Cold War and perceived Soviet strategy. Underlying this was a broader assumption that the Soviets were merely paying lip service to détente, and that Moscow's support for "subversive" movements indicated their actual intent to undermine the West rather than peacefully coexist with it.
According to Crozier, the mainstream British think tanks did not cover these issues, particularly in their analyses of Soviet strategy, preferring instead to focus on conventional military and nuclear issues. To fill this gap, he initially complemented his work with FWF by starting up the Current Affairs Research Services Centre (CARSC) in 1969.
